If a verb can appear in a content-locative construction then it can also appear in a container-locative construction, and vice versa. (Pinker 2007: 35-6)as in:
(1) [to spray] water on the roses.
(2) [to spray] the roses with water. (Pinker 2007: 35)
In contrast to:
(3) to fill the glass with water.
(4) *to fill water into the glass. (Pinker 2007: 50)
According to this exception, he alters the locative rule:
[...] by specifying the change of a container, it is compatible with a construction that is about state-change, and thereby allows us to say [(3)]. But because it says nothing about a cause or manner of motion of the contents, it isn't compatible with a construction that is all about motion, and thereby doesn't allow us to say [(4)].His conclusion at the end of the chapter:
This uncovered a number of basic features of our thought processes: [...] that a frame for thinking about a change of location in real space can be metaphorically extended to conceptualize a change of state as motion in state-space; and that when the mind conceives of an entity as being somwhere or going somewhere, it tends to melt it down to a holistic blob.As far as I understand him, he ascribes this property to the mind.
So, the first thing that struck me was that (3) and (4) sound correct for non-native speakers and I assume it would sound correct to many native speakers as well - depending on the region they're from. Actually you can say both sentences in German - which is, by the way, closely related to English:
(3(DE)) Das Glas mit Wasser füllen.
(4(DE)) Wasser in das Glas füllen.
So this must be specific for English, right? Since he ascribes this to the mind, this must mean that it only works for the English mind which, and here comes the logic conclusion, is different from the German mind. Hence English speakers have another cognition, i.e. they perceive the reality in a different way and therefore (3) is possible, while (4) is not? This would be an argument for linguistic determinism. I know this is nonsense.
_
Pinker, S. Language of Thought. 2007.
2 comments:
Here's a brief explanation.
E.g.
1. "I smothered the dish with sauce."
[Here, the object being focused on is 'the dish'.]
2. "I smothered sauce on the fish."
[Here, the objet being focused on is 'sauce'.]
When I say object, it means the contents being moved. It is what acts upon the subject before.
In a sentence, there has to be a subject and a perdicate. The subject has to be able to make sense on it's own. If you break down the sentence 2 into its subject and predicate;
Subject: I smothered sauce.
Predicate: ...on the fish.
If you put it as sentence, it sound right but to a linguists, he breaks things down and thinks how this sentence is formed. So looking at the subject above, it sounds awefully incorrect...
I hope you do get the gist of it.
The "extended-locative" phenomenon does not necessarily mean that English speakers have another cognitive dimension to work with. He's just proposing that the way we say things affects how we paint the mind picture of it.
The imagined versions of the content-locative and container-locative are, from a comprehension standpoint, identical. The same way both make sense mechanically.
The trick is to look at what Ili Hazirah pointed out about focusing on the objects. Then you will see that the mental images have very subtle differences.
That being said, its like Freudian Psychology, incomplete and imperfect but still useful. The key is to not get hung up on the wobbly consistency the same way English speakers don't get hung up on the inconsistencies of their native language.
It's wild, within the logical holes and pitfalls there is evidence supporting his theory:
Both the English Language and his idea of connecting the flexibility of our verbs to our own psyche are littered with exceptions.
Coincidence? Food for thought.
I like Ili Hazirah's summary of the mechanics piece of it, hopefully this smooths over the self-contradicting nature of the psychology piece of it.
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